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A
mAbstract: There has been a strong interest in short-time work (STW) schemes during
the global financial crisis. Using data for 23 OECD countries for the period 2004 Q1
to 2010 Q4, this paper analyses the quantitative effects of STW programmes on
labour market outcomes. Special attention is given to the dynamic aspects of the
relationship between output shocks and labour market outcomes. The results
indicate the STW raises hours flexibility by increasing the output elasticity of working
time and helps to preserve jobs in the context of a recession by making
employment and unemployment less elastic with respect to output. A key finding is
that the timing of STW is crucial. While STW helped preserving a significant number
of jobs during the crisis, its continued use during the recovery may have slowed the
job-content of the recovery. By the end of 2010, the net effect of STW on
employment was negligible or may even have become negative. However, the gross
impact of STW on the number of jobs saved per quarter remains large and positive
in the majority of countries.
JEL codes: J23; J65; J68
Keywords: Global financial crisis, Partial unemployment benefits, Work sharing1. Introduction
Short-time work (STW) programmes are public schemes that are intended to preserve
jobs at firms experiencing temporarily low demand by encouraging work-sharing, while
also providing income-support to workers whose hours are reduced due to a shortened
workweek or temporary lay-offs. A crucial aspect of all STW schemes is that the con-
tract of an employee with the firm is maintained during the period of STW or the sus-
pension of work. The main purpose of STW schemes is to avoid “excessive” layoffs,
that is, the permanent dismissal of workers during an economic downturn whose jobs
would be viable in the longer-term. In an environment where firms are risk-neutral
and they can fully insure their employees, excessive layoffs are effectively ruled out
(Burdett and Wright, 1989). However, in an environment where firms are financially
constrained, as during a credit crunch, a well-designed STW scheme may help to in-
crease welfare (Braun et al., 2011). Moreover, STW schemes may also help to improve
equity by sharing the burden of adjustment more equally across the workforce (OECD,
2009)1.2013 Hijzen and Martin; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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OECD countries. Most governments in countries with existing schemes took specific
measures in response to the crisis to promote their use, while several others established
new ones. The interest among firms and workers in STW schemes, as measured in
terms of take-up, also tended to be substantial. Across the 25 OECD countries that op-
erated a STW scheme during the global financial crisis, take-up increased from a negli-
gible amount in 2007 to over 1% of dependent employment in 2009. This corresponds
to over 4.5 million workers across the OECD. However, the use of STW differed sub-
stantially across countries. At its peak, take-up amounted to over 7% in Belgium,
around 4 to 5% in Germany and Japan and around 1 to 2% in Austria, Czech Republic,
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Slovakia. In other countries with STW
schemes it remained below 1%. The use of STW declined considerably during 2010 as
a result of the initial economic recovery, with the decline in the use of STW in re-
sponse to the improvement in economic conditions in the early recovery being similar
to the increase in response to the deterioration in aggregate demand during the crisis2.
Given the size and prominence of STW schemes during the global financial crisis, it is
important to evaluate their impact. Two approaches have been used: firm-level and
country-level approaches. The basic idea of firm-level studies is to assess the causal impact
of STW by comparing outcomes of firms that make use of STW with those of comparable
firms that do not. The main challenge is to overcome the selection problem that arises be-
cause firms that participate in STW schemes tend to be less competitive than other firms
that can serve as a control group. As this turns out to be very difficult in practice, many
previous firm-level studies have either concluded that STW is counter-productive or that
it is not possible to overcome the selection problem with the available data3. The study by
Boeri and Brucker (2011) represents a notable exception. They propose a plausible instru-
ment based on the experience of firms with STW before the crisis. This is a valid instru-
ment as long as prior use is a good predictor of use during the crisis and output demand
shocks during the crisis are uncorrelated with shocks before the crisis, which appears to
be the case. They find that STW increases employment growth and that the effect in-
creases in size once the endogeneity of STW with respect to employment growth is taken
into account. Unfortunately, using the same data and a similar strategy, but a somewhat
more sophisticated specification, Bellman et al. (2012) were unable to confirm these
results. As most other firm-level studies, their results indicate that STW increases the out-
put elasticity of employment, possibly due to a problem of weak instruments.
In the light of the mixed success of firm-level studies in identifying the causal impact
of STW, aggregate approaches in the spirit of Abraham and Houseman (1994) and Van
Audenrode (1994) provide a potentially fruitful alternative. Hijzen and Venn (2010)
provide an early assessment of the impact of STW schemes on preserving jobs during
the crisis. Their estimates support the conclusion that STW schemes had an economic-
ally important impact, with the largest impacts of STW on employment in Germany
and Japan among the countries considered. However, the positive impact of STW was
limited to workers with permanent contracts, thereby further increasing labour market
segmentation between workers in regular jobs and workers in temporary jobs. The esti-
mated jobs impact was smaller than the potential number of jobs saved as implied by
the full-time equivalent number of participants in STW. This suggests that STW
schemes end up supporting some jobs that would have been maintained in the absence
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(2011), who make use of largely the same dataset but employed somewhat different es-
timation strategies, reached similar conclusions4.
This paper also analyses the quantitative effects of STW programmes on employment
and hours by exploiting the country and time variation in STW take-up rates. It pro-
vides an update on the initial assessment by Hijzen and Venn (2010) by extending the
time and country coverage of the dataset from 2004 Q1-2009 Q3 to 2004 Q1-2010 Q4
and from 19 to 23 countries5. The use of more recent data is important as it allows
analysing the impact of STW not just during the crisis, but also during the early phase
of the recovery. The econometric analysis takes account of differences in institutional
settings across countries that might affect the relationship between labour market out-
comes and output and addresses the potential endogeneity of STW take-up with re-
spect to labour market conditions using the age of the programme as an instrument.
Moreover, special attention is given to model the dynamic aspects of the relationship
between output, employment and working time.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides information
on the institutional features of STW schemes as they operated during the global finan-
cial crisis as well as suggestive evidence on the role of these features for take up.
Section 3 presents the econometric framework, while Section 4 discusses the data.
Section 5 provides a qualitative discussion of the results based on the econometric esti-
mates, while Section 6 discusses their quantitative implications in terms of the number
of permanent jobs saved since the start of the global financial crisis. Section 7 presents
simple simulations in order to illustrate how the role of STW changes under different
assumptions about the persistence of the output shocks and the use of STW during the
economic recovery. Section 8 concludes.
2. Institutional background
Twenty-five OECD countries operated a STW programme during the global financial
crisis. Hijzen and Venn (2010) provide a detailed overview of the main features of STW
schemes as they operated during the global financial crisis and show there is consider-
able variation in their institutional design. To an important extent, this is likely to re-
flect different strategies for balancing concerns about assuring adequate take-up while
maintaining cost-effectiveness. The latter depends on the importance of deadweight
and displacement effects. Deadweight effects occur when STW subsidies are paid for
jobs that employers would have retained even in the absence of the subsidy, implying
that this spending is a pure transfer to firms which does not limit job losses6. Displace-
ment effects occur when STW schemes preserve jobs that are not viable without the
subsidy, even after business conditions recover, and will be suppressed once the subsidy
comes to an end. Following Hijzen and Venn (2010), Table 1 summarises the main fea-
tures of STW schemes for the 18 countries used in the analysis which operated a STW
scheme during the crisis along four key dimensions: work-sharing requirements, eligi-
bility requirements, conditionality requirements and generosity.
 Work-sharing requirements specify the range of permissible reductions in weekly
hours for short-time workers. Minimum permissible hours reductions are intended
to limit STW participation to firms experiencing important financial difficulties,














Score in % Score in % % of normal total labour cost for a
single worker without children who
usually earns the average wage
% of the average earnings
for a single worker
without children
Number of month
Ausfria 80 67 25 17 55 24
Belgium 100 50 13 0 70 5
Canada 40 100 0 0 61 12
Czech Republic 100 67 25 25 60 6
Denmail 60 33 13 0 61 6
Finland 75 83 25 0 51 100
France 100 67 25 39 75 13
Germany 90 100 25 8 60 24
Hungary 80 33 50 0 100 12
Ireland 60 33 25 0 31 ..
Italy 100 33 25 17 83 24
Japan 100 100 0 31 66 28
Netherlands 30 67 50 0 73 13
Norway 60 67 25 23 64 12
Poland 100 67 50 13 49 6
Portugal 100 33 33 16 72 18
Slovak Republic 96 67 0 48 73 3
Spam 67 33 50 0 61 24
Not available.
Strictness of eligibility requirements: Index based on the following three eligibility requirements to STW schemes: i) justification of economic need for firms; ii) social partner agreement; and iii) obligation for
participating workers to be eligible for UB, which attributes a value of one-third for the presence of each eligibility requirement.
Strictness of conditionality requirements: Index based on the following four conditionality requirements: i) compulsory training; ii) recovery plan; iii) no dismissal; iv) job-search requirement for employee, which
attributes a value of 0.25 for the presence of each conditionality requirement.
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work-sharing by spreading the burden of adjustment across a larger group of
workers.
 Eligibility requirements set conditions that employers or workers must meet in
order to participate in STW programmes. The indicator ranges from zero to one
and attributes a score of one third, respectively, for requiring a justification of
economic need by the firm; the agreement of the social partners; and workers to be
eligible for unemployment benefits.
 Conditionality requirements set behavioural requirements for both employers and
workers participating in STW schemes. The indicator ranges from zero to one and
attributes one quarter for, respectively, requiring workers on short-time work to
participate in training; requiring the development of a recovery plan; prohibiting
dismissals during, or, for a short period after participation in STW schemes; and,
active job search by workers on short-time work.
 The generosity of a STW programme determines the cost of participation for both
firms and workers and the maximum length of participation. For firms this depends
on the extent to which they are required to share in the cost of hours not worked,
while for workers this depends on the extent to which they are compensated for
hours not worked (i.e. the replacement rate). Limits to the maximum duration for
which STW subsidies are available are likely to play a crucial role in ensuring
countries that STW schemes do not end up becoming an obstacle to job creation
in the recovery.
In order to get some idea of the institutional features of STW schemes for take-up,
we make use of the following dynamic panel data model:
Tit ¼ ∑Xx¼0γxT it−1 1þ Xi−Xð Þ½  þ ∑Xx¼0αxlny 1þ Xi−Xð Þ½  þ Zit þ Dy þ Dq  Di þ εit ð1Þ
which expresses the STW take-up rate (T), defined as the share of STW participants in
dependent employment, as a function of its past value and the log value of real output
(y), the institutional features of STW (X) and a number of controls (Z, D)7. The coeffi-
cient on the semi-elasticity of take-up with respect to output, α0, measures the respon-
siveness of take-up to economic shocks, while the coefficient on the lagged dependent
value, γo, captures the persistence of STW and gives an indication of the time partici-
pants spend in STW schemes. Both coefficients are allowed to differ according to the
main characteristics of STW schemes by interacting the lagged dependent variable and
the output variable with indicators of the institutional features of STW schemes
(expressed in terms of deviations from their sample means). Z includes a series of con-
trol variables to take account of, respectively, the time STW schemes have been in ex-
istence and the broader institutional context in which STW schemes operate. In the
present case, the institutional context is taken into account by controlling for any fac-
tors that affect STW but do not vary over time through the use of country fixed effects
as well as by including a time-varying indicator of the stringency of employment pro-
tection. The regressions account for macro-economic changes that are common across
countries through the inclusion of year-fixed effects and country-specific seasonality
profiles through the inclusion of quarter-times-country dummies.
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features of STW and take up (Table 2). Nevertheless, the analysis provides a number of
tentative insights:
 Restrictions on the permissible range of working-time reductions reduce the
responsiveness of take-up to changes in output, but increase its persistence. This is
likely to primarily reflect the role of minimum requirements on hours reductions
since these are typically used as a way to restrict take-up to firms experiencing
financial difficulties.
 Eligibility requirements tend to reduce the responsiveness of take-up to output
shocks. The negative role of eligibility criteria is likely to be intended as eligibility
criteria seek to reduce deadweight losses by limiting the use of STW to firms that
really need it. Conditionality requirements are found to increase the responsiveness
of take-up to output shocks when included on its own, but this effect disappears
when including all key dimensions of STW simultaneously in the regressions.
 There is some evidence that requiring firms to share in the cost of STW reduces
the responsiveness of take-up to output shocks. This may help to limit the use of
STW to workers that firms would like to keep. However, this effect does not
survive when including all key characteristics of STW schemes simultaneously.
 While the maximum duration for which STW subsidies are available and the
degree to which employers share in the cost of STW are often considered to be
features that help ensure that firms do not use STW subsidies for too long, there is
no evidence that these factors reduce persistence.3. Econometric methodology
This paper exploits the country and time variation in take-up rates to analyse the quan-
titative impacts of STW schemes on labour market outcomes. Exploiting the variation
in the intensity with which STW is used across countries and time has a number of ad-
vantages. First, exploiting the variation across countries, rather than between participat-
ing and non-participating firms within countries, avoids the selection problem that
characterises firm-level studies. While it is true that exploiting the country and time
variation introduces important new concerns in relation to selection and endogeneity,
we argue these can be addressed satisfactorily, whereas this is not always the case at
the firm level. Second, the approach used here focuses on the net effects of STW on
labour market outcomes, after taking account of its effects on both participating and non-
participating firms. To the extent that STW also affects labour market outcomes in non-
participating firms, for example, by reducing labour mobility, this could be potentially im-
portant. Thus, in contrast with firm-level studies, country-level studies are not confined
to estimating partial equilibrium effects but may also pick up potentially important gen-
eral equilibrium effects.3.1 Static model
Building on previous work by Hijzen and Venn (2010) and Boeri and Brucker (2011),
we adopt an empirical specification that allows the use of STW to have a direct effect
on the growth rate of the outcome of interest and an indirect effect through its impact
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specifically, we start off with the following first-difference model:
Δlit ¼ αΔlnyit þ βTit þ γΔlnyþ Tit þ Dy þ Dq  þεit ð2aÞ
where Δl refers to the quarter-to-quarter change in the log of the labour market out-
come of interest, Δlny to the quarter-to-quarter change in the log of output, T refers to
the number of participants in STW as a share of dependent employment. As in the
take-up analysis, the regressions also include year and quarter-times-country dummies
to control for common macro-economic trends across countries as well as country-
specific seasonality patterns.ε refers to a random error term. Subscripts i and t refer to
country and time. The coefficient α provides an estimate of the elasticity of the labour
market outcome of interest with respect to output in countries that do not operate
STW schemes. The coefficient β provides an estimate of the direct effect of STW on
the growth rate of the labour market outcome of interest. The coefficient γ provides an
estimate of the indirect effect of STW on the elasticity of the labour market outcome
of interest with respect to output. This is the main parameter of interest.
In order to explore to what extent the impact of output on the labour market of
interest can be summarised by a contemporaneous relationship as in (2a) or whether
some of the impact of output only occurs with a lag, the model is also estimated by lag-
ging output changes and STW take-up by, respectively, one and two quarters. As will
be shown below, the results for both employment and average hours are rather sensi-
tive to these slightly different specifications, suggesting that modelling the dynamic ef-
fects of STW is very important.
3.2 Dynamic model
In order to analyse the dynamic effects of the use of STW schemes on labour market
outcomes we make use of dynamic regression models that allow both for persistence in
the outcome variable of interest as well as lagged responses to changes in output. More
specifically, we re-parameterise an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model of
order (1, s) to derive the following augmented error-correction model:
Δlit ¼ φ lit−1−δlnyð Þ þ ∑2s¼0αsΔlnyit−sþ∑2s¼0βsT it−s þ ∑2s¼0γsΔlnyit−sT it−s þ Dy þ Dq  Di þ εit
ð2bÞ
where φ = − (1 − λ) and δ ¼ ∑2s¼0αs= 1−λð Þ: λ captures the degree of persistence in the
outcome variable of interest, δ the long-term output elasticity and αs the short-term
output elasticity with zero STW at time t + s. The model is augmented to allow for a
direct impact of STW on the growth rate of the labour market outcome and an indirect
effect through its impact on the short-term output elasticity. The β-coefficients capture
the direct effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the take-up rate of STW on the
growth rate of the labour market outcome of interest, while the γ-coefficients capture
the impact of a 1 percentage point increase in the take-up rate on the short-term out-
put elasticity. The dummy structure is the same as in the static model.
The general error-correction model described by (2b) is only appropriate for outcome
variables that have a stable long-term relationship with output such as employment
and total hours worked. However, it is not appropriate for stationary variables which
are independent of output in the long-run such as average hours worked. In this case,
Table 2 The role of institutional characteristics for the use of STWa.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Lagged dependent variable 0.689 *** 0.693 *** 0.695 *** 0.658 *** 0.660 *** 0.596 *** 0.558 ***
(0.060) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059) (0.068) (0.077) (0.085)
Number of years since
STW was introduced
0.105 0.061 *** 0.062 *** 0.078 *** 0.076 *** 0.066 *** 0.098 ***
(0.090) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.024)
Log output −4.853 *** −4.272 *** −4.394 *** −4.482 *** −4.547 *** −4.556 *** −5.625 ***
(1.296) (1.384) (1.197) (1.274) (1.210) (1.125) (1.530)
Strictness of employment protection 0.521 ** 0.463 ** 0.448 ** 0.480 ** 0.451 ** 0.491 ** 0.435 **
(0.211) (0.201) (0.199) (0.198) (0.198) (0.210) (0.215)
UB net replacement rate















Interaction terms with lagged dependent variable
Cost to employer hours not worked 0.003 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
STW net replacement rate 0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0,006)
Maximum duration −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0 001)
Strictness of eligibility criteria 0.141 0.342
(0.171) (0.256)
Strictness of conditionality criteria -0.440 0.214
(0.413) (0.536)
Difference of maximum
and minimum permissible %
























Table 2 The role of institutional characteristics for the use of STWa. (Continued)
Interaction terms with output






STW net replacement rate 0.007 −0.077
(0.066) (0.061)
Maximum duration −0.013 −0.021
(0.020) (0.030)
Strictness of eligibility criteria −8.083 ** −9.372 **
(3.607) (4.461)
Strictness of conditionality criteria 15.560 ** 12.840
(7.998) (10.14)
Difference of maximum
and minimum permissible %





Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Number of observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 306
R-squared 0.954 0.953 0.953 0.955 0.954 0.955 0.959
***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors in brackets. Regressions include country time quarter dummies and year dummies.
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and STW that results when φ=0.3.3 Controlling for selection
As noted by Hijzen and Venn (2010), simple OLS estimates of the models above may yield
misleading results. First, estimates of these models may be biased because the output elas-
ticity may not be just a function of STW but also of other institutional settings. For ex-
ample, OECD (2010) argues that STW has tended to develop in many countries as a way
to compensate firms for the negative impact of employment protection on external flexi-
bility by promoting internal flexibility. When STW is positively correlated with institu-
tional factors that reduce the output elasticity of labour demand, this is likely to lead to an
overestimate of the impact of STW on preserving jobs. Assuming that the role of these
other institutional factors does not vary over time, Hijzen and Venn (2010) propose a
difference-in-differences approach that focuses on the difference in the output elasticity of
labour demand before and during the crisis across countries. Boeri and Brucker (2011) do
not control for the role of unobservable factors, but directly control for the main institu-
tional factors that are likely to affect the elasticity of labour demand and are correlated
with the use of STW. This paper adopts a similar approach by including indicators of the
stringency of employment protection and the generosity of unemployment insurance as
independent variables as well as interacted with the change in log output.
Second, STW may be endogenous with respect to the outcome of variable of interest to
the role of macro-economic information that affects both employment and STW, but is
not captured by the change in output. In the case of employment, not accounting for
endogeneity is likely to lead to the underestimation of the impact of STW. Hijzen and
Venn (2010) keep the level of STW during the crisis constant to reduce endogeneity con-
cerns, but this does not solve the problem entirely. Their estimates of the number of jobs
saved are, therefore, likely to be on the conservative side. This paper follows the approach
used in Boeri and Brucker (2011) who address the problem of endogeneity through the
use of an instrumental variable for STW based on the number of years for which a scheme
has been in existence. Since it takes time to learn about the existence and operation of
labour market programmes such as STW, take-up is likely to increase with the time a
programme has been in existence. This is indeed confirmed by the evidence in Section 2.
To the extent that the macro-economic conditions that might have given rise to the estab-
lishment of the programme are unrelated to the macro-economic conditions that led to
the surge in STW during the global financial crisis, this provides a valid instrument for
STW. As this condition is clearly not valid for programmes that were established during
the global financial crisis, countries that did so were excluded from the IV estimations.4. Data
For the purposes of this paper, the dataset constructed by Hijzen and Venn (2010) was
extended to cover a larger number of countries and to include a larger part of the re-
cent crisis period. This increased the number of countries covered from 19 to 23 and
the data period from 2004 Q1-2009Q4 to 2004 Q1-2010 Q4. The use of five additional
quarters over a period in which the use of STW was relatively high is considered to be
an important contribution of this paper. Of the 23 countries that are included in the
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crisis, five introduced a new scheme in response to the crisis and five countries never
operated a STW scheme. Since national data on the use of STW are not readily com-
parable across countries significant efforts were made to enhance cross-country com-
parability in terms of the kind of programmes that are covered and the way take-up is
recorded across countries. Take-up is measured in this paper as the number of partici-
pants across months as a share of dependent employment. Note that it would have
been preferable to measure take-up in terms of full-time equivalents (FTE). However,
this requires information on the reduction in working time among STW participants
which is not available for the majority of countries. For further details on the construc-
tion of this dataset, see Hijzen and Venn (2010) and the Additional file 1.
Table 3 provides an overview of the use of STW before, during and after the crisis for
countries for which comparable data are available8. At the onset of the crisis in the
fourth quarter of 2007, take-up of STW was negligible in most countries. An important
exception is Belgium where take-up amounted to about 3% of dependent employment.
Finland, France, and Italy also had moderate levels of take-up, but well below 1% of
employment. During the crisis, take-up surged dramatically. At its peak, it amounted to
over 7% in Belgium, around 4 to 5% in Germany and Japan, 2.5% in Italy, and around 1
to 2% in Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Slovak
Republics. In the other countries, it remained below 1%. In all countries, take-up has
declined substantially since reaching its peak. Only in Belgium, Italy and Japan did
take-up exceed 1% of employment as of 2010 Q4.
The rise in take-up is closely related to the deterioration in business conditions dur-
ing the crisis and their subsequent recovery, although there are considerable differences
in the extent to which take-up responded to changes in GDP. Take-up increased most
strongly in response to the crisis in Belgium, where take-up rose by more than one per-
centage point for each percent decline in GDP. The responsiveness of take-up was also
strong in countries such as Germany and Japan, where it increased by more than half a
percentage point for each percent decline in GDP. By contrast, responsiveness was very
low in Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Portugal. During the initial recovery, the respon-
siveness of take-up to improvements in GDP was similar to that during the crisis in
most countries. This suggests that concerns about the difficulty of scaling down STW
schemes in the recovery may not be very important.
The core database on labour market outcomes and output is derived from Eurostat’s
Quarterly National Accounts, the European Labour Force Survey and various national
sources for the non-European countries. Output is defined in real terms in national
currency using the GDP deflator.
5. Econometric results
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present the discussion of the static and the dynamic results re-
spectively. The discussion focuses largely on the labour market outcomes for perman-
ent workers in relation to their employment, average hours worked and total hours.
This reflects previous results by Hijzen and Venn (2010) which showed that the posi-
tive effects of STW are largely limited to permanent workers. The discussion of the
static results in Section 5.1 mainly serves to get a first indication of the possible role of
STW on labour market outcomes and to motivate the dynamic analysis in Section 5.2.
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are discussed in more detail. Section 5.3 discusses dynamic results in relation to the UB
recipiency rate and the harmonised unemployment rate.
5.1 Static results on employment and hours
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results from the static model based on the contemporan-
eous relationship between labour market outcomes, output and the use of STW for three
different specifications: OLS without institutional controls (column 1); OLS with institu-
tional controls (column 2); IV with controls (column 3). The results in column 1 of Panel
A suggest that STW has no or a positive effect on the output elasticity of permanent em-
ployment and a positive effect on the output elasticity of working time for permanent
workers. Thus, the results suggest that, as expected, STW increases the flexibility of aver-
age hours worked, but do not provide evidence that the reduction in working time associ-
ated with the use of STW in recessions mitigates the employment response to negative
output shocks. These results do not change much when controlling for selection effects
by including measures for the level of employment protection and the generosity of un-
employment benefits or by instrumenting STW using the age of the programme.
However, as shown in Panels B and C of Table 4, the results change markedly for em-
ployment and average hours worked when using the first or the second lags of output
changes and take-up instead of their contemporaneous values. For example, the interaction
term between take-up and the change in output is consistently negative and statistically
significant in the case of employment, in line with findings in previous studies. Moreover,
the interaction between take-up and the change in output in the case of average hours is
positive when using the first lag (Panel B), as in Panel A, but becomes negative and statisti-
cally significant when using the second lag (Panel C). Importantly, these results suggest
that the impact of STW on the output elasticity of employment only materialises after
some time, while the impact of STW on average hours worked tends to be immediate.
These differences arise largely because employment only responds slowly to output
shocks, while average hours respond quickly, but tend to revert to their optimal long-term
values relatively soon. This is consistent with a model in which adjusting employment is
relatively costly, while adjusting average hours does not involve a fixed adjustment, but
may affect variable costs (Bils, 1987; Cabellero et al., 1997). This implies that it is optimal
for firms to adjust to temporary and relatively short-lived shocks by adjusting average
hours and to more persistent shocks by adjusting employment. This is consistent with re-
sults in Table 4 that suggest that employment responds more strongly to output shocks
that occurred with two lags than to contemporaneous shocks and average hours respond
positively to contemporaneous output changes and negatively to lagged output changes.
The sensitivity of the static results to the assumed inter-temporal relationship be-
tween labour market outcomes, output and take-up highlights the importance of mod-
elling the dynamics of employment and hours with respect to output in a more
detailed manner. This is done in the next sub-section.
5.2 Dynamic results on employment and hours
The dynamic results are reported in Table 5. The coefficients in relation to the change
in output summarise the average impact of a 1% increase in output on the labour mar-
ket outcome of interest in the absence of STW schemes. As one would expect, the
Table 3 The use of short-time work during the global financial crisis
Short-time work take-up rate Change in the take-up rate Ratio of the change in the monthly takeup
rate to the change in GDP
Percentage of dependent employment Percentage of dependent employment Percentage points
2007 Q4a Peak in STW takeup 2010 Q4 2007 Q4 to peak
in STW takeup
Peak in STW takeup
to 2010 Q4
2007 Q4 to peak
in STW takeup
Peak in STW takeup
k 2010 Q4
Austria 0.00 1.16 015 1.16 −1.01 −0.35 −0.24
Belgium 3.03 7.45 3.79 4.43 −3.66 −1.38 −0.91
Canada 0.01 0.42 0.12 0.41 −0.30 −0.13 −0.07
Czech Republic 0.00 1.96 0.25 1.96 −1.71 −0.46 −0.39
Denmark 0.00 0.48 .. 0.48 .. −0.06 ..
Finland 0.35 1.87 0.99 1.52 −0.88 −0.18 −0.16
France 0.20 1.11 0.77 0.91 −0.34 −0.26 −0.15
Germany 0.06 4.15 0.55 4.09 −3.60 −0.74 −0.67
Hungary 0.00 0.86 0.05 0.86 −0.81 −0.12 −0.30
Ireland 0.00 1.17 0.84 1.17 −0.34 −0.10 0.22
Italy 0.41 2.49 1.78 2.07 −0.70 −0.35 −0.45
Japan 0.00 4.59 1.33 4.59 −3.26 −0.64 −0.62
Netherlands 0.00 1.11 0.15 1.11 −0.96 −0.31 −0.40
Norway 0.07 0.79 0.36 0.72 −0.44 −0.29 −0.58
Poland 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 −0.03 0.00 −0.01
Portugal 0.01 0.36 0.17 0.35 −0.19 −0.11 −0.20
Slovak Republic 0.00 1.37 0.08 1.37 −1.29 −0.41 −0.38
Spain 0.00 0.79 0.47 0.79 −0.32 −0.18 −0.45
Not available.
a) 2008 Q1 for Spain.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/5proportional impact of output changes on total hours worked approximately equals the
sum of its proportional impact on employment and working time9. The bulk of the
contemporaneous response in total hours is driven by changes in working time. How-
ever, the impact of average hours is reversed relatively quickly, while the full impact on
employment only materialises slowly over time. The negative impact of a 1% reduction
in output on employment equals about 0.1% at time t, an additional 0.1 at t + 1 and an
additional to 0.3% at time t + 2.
In principle, STW schemes could affect labour demand directly and indirectly by af-
fecting the way output shocks are transmitted to labour demand. The results, however,
generally provide little evidence for any direct effects of STW. Only when the
endogeneity of take-up is taken into account is there some evidence that STW reduces
the contemporaneous growth rate of average hours worked independently of output
changes. This is, perhaps, not surprising since STW is a programme that is explicitly
designed to reduce working time. More interestingly, there is some indication that
STW take-up slows employment growth in the future. However, this effect is econom-
ically very small and only in one specification statistically significant at the 10% level.
In principle, the direct negative effect of STW on employment could reflect its adverse
impact on the reallocation of workers between more and less productive firms10. Con-
cerns about the potential adverse effects of STW on job reallocation have motivated
recommendations by the OECD that STW should only be used in the context of eco-
nomic downturns and that its use should be strictly temporary (OECD, 2009, 2010).
The indirect effects of STW on the responsiveness of labour market outcomes to output
shocks are potentially important. STW schemes increase the contemporaneous elasticity
of average hours worked for permanent workers with respect to output shocks. The im-
mediate impact of STW on average hours worked of permanent workers is sizeable: a one
percentage point increase in the STW take-up rate increases the contemporaneous output
elasticity of average hours worked by about 0.25 (column 1), or about 10 hours in the case
of full-time workers with a regular working week of 40 hours11. STW does not have an
immediate impact on the employment elasticity of permanent workers, but exerts a sig-
nificant impact on the output elasticity of employment with some lag. More specifically,
the estimates suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the take-up rate of STW re-
duces the employment elasticity of permanent workers by 0.09 after two quarters.
The results in Table 5 are robust to a variety of wide different specifications. In par-
ticular, the results are qualitatively similar when: countries without STW schemes are
excluded from the sample; additional variables are included to control for the role of
employment protection and the generosity of unemployment insurance and their im-
pact on the responsiveness of labour inputs to output shocks; the potential endogeneity
of STW is addressed by instrumenting the STW take-up rate by the number of years
since the introduction of STW as suggested by Boeri and Brucker (2011).
Column (2) of Table 5 reports the results that include indicators for the stringency of
employment protection and the generosity of unemployment insurance independently as
well as in interaction with the change in output. These results suggest that employment
protection, similar to STW, reduces the output elasticity of permanent employment. The
generosity of unemployment insurance, if anything, increases the elasticity of employment
with respect to output, suggesting that more generous unemployment benefits increase
the risk of job loss. The results with respect to STW are essentially unchanged.
Table 4 Static results on the impact of STW on the labour market outcomes of permanent workers
Change in employment Change in average hours worked Change in total hours worked













A. Contemporaneous output shocks and take-up rate
Output growth 0.194 *** 0.319 *** −6.031 0.258 *** 0.208 −6.977 0.454 *** 0.452 −13.009
(0.050) (0.101) (5.291) (0.097) (0.256) (6.333) (0.110) (0.288) (9.050)
STW take-up rate 0.000 0.000 0.276 0.002 0.002 0.317 0.002 0.002 0.593
(0.001) (0.001) (0.236) (0.002) (0.002) (0.278) (0.002) (0.002) (0.400)
Output growth times STW take-up rate 0.002 0.022 0.080 * 0.168 ** 0.146 * 0.125 0.172 ** 0.164 ** 0.206 *
(0.033) (0.035) (0.045) (0.069) (0.077) (0.107) (0.073) (0.081) (0.110)
Overall strictness of employment protection −0.009 ** −0.357 −0.001 −0.405 −0.009 −0.762
(0.004) (0.302) (0.013) (0.357) (0.013) (0.513)
UB net replacement rate (averageover 60 months) 0.000 ** −0.005 0.000 −0.006 0.000 −0.011
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.007)
Output growth times overall strictness of
employment protection
−0.062 1.192 0.037 1.669 0.013 2.861
(0.055) (1.149) (0.130) (1.401) (0.144) (1.984)
Output growth times UB net replacement rate
(average over 60)
−0.001 0.059 0001 0.066 0.000 0.125
(0.002) (0.048) (0.004) (0.058) (0.005) (0.082)
Number of countries 23 23 13 23 23 13 23 23 13
Number of observations 633 617 354 633 617 354 633 617 354




















Table 4 Static results on the impact of STW on the labour market outcomes of permanent workers (Continued)
B. Output shocks and take-up rate lagged one quarter
Output growth 0.160 ** 0.097 −0.052 −0.151 −0.207 −1.258 *** 0.008 −0.226 −1.310 ***
(0.065) (0.105) (0.217) (0.105) (0.280) (0.443) (0.129) (0.305) (0.496)
STW take-up rate 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.040 *** 0.005 ** 0.006 ** 0.044 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Output growth times STW take-up rate −0.083 ** −0.063 −0.057 0.070 0.089 0.305 *** −0.009 0.023 0.249*
(0.038) (0.041) (0.051) (0.063) (0.071) (0.117) (0.081) (0.085) (0.139)
Overall strictness of employment protection −0.009 ** −0.009 −0.018 −0.060 *** −0.026* −0.068 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
UB net replacement rate (averageover 60 months) 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 −0.001 * 0.000 −0.001 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Output growth times overall strictness of
employment protection
0.044 0.030 0.085 0.043 0.184 0.073
(0.064) (0.108) (0.143) (0.214) (0.151) (0.218)
Output growth times UB net replacement rate
(average over 60)
−0.002 0 −0.004 0.009* −0.005 0.01
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Number of countries 23 23 13 23 23 13 23 23 13
Number of observations 614 598 344 614 598 344 614 598 344




















Table 4 Static results on the impact of STW on the labour market outcomes of permanent workers (Continued)
C. Output shocks and take-up rate lagged two quarters
Output growth 0.290 *** 0.212 ** 0.260 −0.121 −0.338 −0.400 0.170 −0.230 −0.140
(0.046) (0.098) (0.177) (0.098) (0.270) (0.403) (0.113) (0.293) (0.441)
STW take-up rate 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.003 * 0.003* 0.016 *** 0.003 0.003 0.015 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Output growth times STW take-up rate −0.133 *** −0.134 *** −0.139 *** −0.134 * −0.157 ** −0.218 ** −0.262 *** −0.293 *** −0.357 ***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.047) (0.070) (0.076) (0.101) (0.080) (0.086) (0.106)
Overall strictness of employment protection −0.008 * 0.000 −0.002 −0.015 −0.010 −0.015
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
UB net replacement rate (averageover 60 months) 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Output growth times overall strictness of
employment protection
−0.011 −0.152 ** 0.004 −0.023 0.044 −0.175
(0.047) (0.074) (0.126) (0.209) (0.138) (0.218)
Output growth times UB net replacement rate
(average over 60
0.002 0.005 ** 0.006 0.008 0.009** 0.014 **
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Number of countries 23 23 13 23 23 13 23 23 13
Number of observations 593 577 333 593 577 333 593 577 333
R-squared 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.932 0.93 0.93
***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors in brackets. Regressions include country time quarter dummies and year dummies.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/5Column (3) of Table 5 reports the results that are obtained when, in addition to control-
ling for the independent effect of employment protection and unemployment insurance,
the STW take-up rate is instrumented by the number of years the STW programme has
been operational. As this is only valid instrument for countries that had a STW schemes
in place before the start of the crisis, countries without STW schemes or countries that
established such a scheme in 2008 or later are excluded from the estimation sample. Since
the endogeneity of STW with respect to labour market outcomes is likely to underesti-
mate the impact of STW on the output elasticity of employment, one would expect its im-
pact to become stronger after instrumenting. This is not observed in Table 5. The impact
of STW on the employment elasticity becomes, if anything, somewhat smaller. This most
likely reflects the change in the country sample with respect to column (2).
5.3 Unemployment results
Two different measures of the unemployment rate are used: i) UB recipiency rate (ratio
of UB recipients to the labour force); ii) the harmonised unemployment rate (ratio of
unemployed jobseekers to the labour force). In order to facilitate the interpretation of
the coefficients STW is now expressed in terms of the labour force instead of
dependent employment as before. The unemployment results are of major policy inter-
est for two reasons. First, they provide a direct indication of the effectiveness of STW
in keeping unemployment down, a key objective of STW schemes. Second, they can
help to provide an indication of the fiscal costs and benefits associated with STW. An
easy way to get a sense of this is to compare expenditures in the context of STW
schemes with expenditures savings due to the role of STW for the number of un-
employment benefit recipients. In order to see how the unemployment results may
shed light on this, it is useful to phrase some informal predictions in relation to the co-
efficients on the interaction terms of output growth and take-up.
When all jobs subject to STW would be suppressed in the absence of STW and all job
losers would become unemployed, one would expect the sum of the coefficients on the
interaction terms between output growth and take-up to approach one. However, this is
unlikely to be the case in practice for several reasons. First, STW is a form of work-
sharing and, consequently, not all jobs subject to STW are at risk. It is more appropriate,
therefore, to focus on the full-time equivalent of the number of STW participants. As-
suming an average reduction in working time of about 10%, as suggested by Hijzen and
Venn (2010), one would expect the sum of the coefficients on the interaction terms be-
tween output growth and take-up to approach 0.25. Second, not all jobs supported by
STW, even when expressed in full-time equivalents, might be suppressed in the absence
of STW due to the role of deadweight effects. Third, not all workers that would have lost
their job in the absence of STW would have become unemployed. Some might have
found another job quickly, whereas others might have decided to leave the labour force.
Assuming that the generosity of STW and unemployment benefits is similar as well as the
duration of STW and unemployment, one would expect the fiscal balance associated with
STW to be negative. While the first assumption seems reasonable (see Hijzen and Venn,
2010), this is less obvious for the second. The fiscal balance of STW may turn positive if
the expected duration of unemployment exceeds that of STW.
The unemployment results reported in Table 6 generally mirror those with respect to
permanent employment. STW has a tendency to mitigate the unemployment impact of
Table 5 Dynamic results on the impact of STW on the labour market outcomes of (Cont.)
Change in employment Change in average hours worked Change in total hours worked
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
OLS OLS with institution IV with institution OLS OLS with institution IV with institution OLS OLS with institution IV with institution
Lagged dependent
variable in level
−0.060 ** −0.087 *** −0.142 ** −0.248 *** −0.300 *** −0.372 ***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.057) (0.046) (0.052) (0.081)
Output 0.015 0.014 0.093* 0.112 *** 0.098 *** 0.364 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.052) (0.032) (0.034) (0.093)
Output growth t 0.125 *** 0.215 ** 0.381 0.321 *** 0.442 1.946 *** 0.392 *** 0.777 ** 4.224 ***
(0.048) (0.108) (0.387) (0.108) (0.294) (0.655) (0.111) (0.302) (0.912)
t-1 0.100 * 0.140 0.151 −0.216 ** −0.333 −1.394 ** −0.082 −0.128 −0.970 *
(0.059) (0.122) (0.234) (0.107) (0.347) (0.566) (0.102) (0.341) (0.549)
t-2 0.271 *** 0.227 ** 0.301 * −0.094 −0.192 0.281 0.234 ** 0.081 0.439
(0.045) (0.100) (0.177) (0.103) (0.338) (0.507) (0.106) (0.308) (0.504)
STW take-up rate t 0.001 0.001 −0.016 0.008 0.006 −0.090 *** 0.008 0.005 −0.177 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.037)
t-1 0.000 0.001 0.005 −0.008 −0.006 0.036 *** −0.008 −0.005 0.031 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
t-2 −0.002 −0.002 −0.005 * 0.003 0.002 −0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Output growth times
STW take-up rate
t 0.055 0.059 0.105 * 0.253 ** 0.267 ** 0.013 0.235 ** 0.250 ** 0.067
7(0.043) (0.042) (0.053) (0.102) (0.109) (0.117) (0.103) (0.100) (0.113)
t-1 −0.053 −0.057 −0.108 ** 0.051 −0.010 0.310 ** 0.011 −0.043 0.187
(0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.082) (0.090) (0.142) (0.091) (0.092) (0.135)
t-2 −0.090 ** −0.089 ** −0.081 * −0.148 ** −0.129 −0.327 *** −0.236 *** −0.209 ** −0.314 ***




















Table 5 Dynamic results on the impact of STW on the labour market outcomes of (Cont.) (Continued)
Overall strictness of
employment protection
t −0.017 0.010 0.084 *** 0.145 *** 0.082 *** 0.289 ***
(0.012) (0.027) (0.029) (0.049) (0.027) (0.064)
t-1 0.012 0.014 −0.202 *** −0.165 ** −0.171 *** −0.135 *
(0.014) (0.022) (0.061) (0.079) (0.058) (0.075)
t-2 0.000 0.010 0.118 ** 0.093 0.076 0.059




t −0.099 * −0.265 ** −0.076 −0.390 −0.329 ** −1.226 ***
(0.059) (0.107) (0.147) (0.253) (0.141) (0.285)
t-1 0.006 0.017 0.187 0.130 0.123 −0.014
(0.071) (0.113) (0.174) (0.260) (0.165) (0.228)
t-2 −0.056 −0.217 ** −0.084 −0.033 −0.143 −0.378 *
(0.056) (0.084) (0.165) (0.231) (0.158) (0.223)
UB net replacement rate
(average over 60 months)
t 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001* 0.004 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001
t-1 0.000 −0.001 ** −0.003 *** −0.004 *** −0.003 *** −0.004 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
t-2 0.000 0.000 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 ** 0.002 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Output growth times UB
net replacement rate
(average over 60 months)
t 0.002 0.003 −0.001 −0.015* 0.002 −0.027 ***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010)
t-1 −0.002 −0.002 −0.004 0.010 −0.004 0.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
t-2 0.003 * 0.007 *** 0.006 −0.002 0.009 ** 0.010




















Table 5 Dynamic results on the impact of STW on the labour market outcomes of (Cont.) (Continued)
Number of countries 23 23 13 23 23 13 23 23 13
Number of observations 589 573 330 589 573 330 589 573 330
R-squared 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Robust standard errors in brackets. Regressions include country time quarter dummies and year dummies.
a) Dependent variables and output in logs.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/5output shocks: the increase in unemployment as a result of a reduction in output tends to
be smaller in the context of STW. Moreover, the impact of STW on the elasticity of the
unemployment rate with respect to output materialises only with a lag, reflecting the
lagged impact of output changes on employment. Thus, STW not only helps to maintain
employment in the context of a recession, it also helps to keep unemployment down. The
results are qualitatively similar across specifications. Moreover, the cumulative size of the
coefficients the interactions terms is consistently much smaller than 0.25, suggesting that
deadweight effects are important or that not all job losers in the absence of STW would
become unemployed. However, there is considerable uncertainty about the precise quanti-
tative impact of STW. The impact of STW on the output elasticity of unemployment
tends to be considerably more positive when controlling for the endogeneity of STW and
when using the harmonised unemployment rate as the dependent variable.
6. Quantifying the role of STW during the global financial crisis
In order to get a sense of the quantitative impact of STW schemes, the estimated coeffi-
cients reported in column (1) of Table 5 are used to calculate the proportional and abso-
lute impacts of STW for permanent employment since the start of the crisis until 2010
Q412. Differences across countries are exclusively driven by differences in the evolution of
GDP and the STW take-up rate since the start of the crisis. The country results have no
bearing on the effectiveness of schemes in different countries beyond affecting the respon-
siveness of take-up to changes in economic conditions. The results are reported in Figure 1
for Germany, Italy and Japan, three large countries where the use of STW during the glo-
bal financial crisis was particularly pronounced. The results for all countries are available
upon request from the authors. The following insights emerge:
 Short-time work schemes had a significant impact on preserving jobs during the
crisis. The largest impact is observed in Germany, Italy and Japan. In Germany,
Italy and Japan, the net impact since the start of the crisis attained a peak when
permanent employment is estimated to have been, respectively, 2%, 0.9% and 1.1%
higher than what it would have been in the absence of short-time work. This
corresponds to about 580.000 jobs in Germany, 130.000 in Italy and 445.000 in Japan.
 However, the same estimates also suggest that the continued use of STW during
the recovery exerted a negative influence over the job-content of the recovery. As a
result, the net effect on employment has fallen importantly in the recovery and in a
few countries even has become negative. In the last quarter of 2010, the net
employment impact of STW since the start of the crisis was slightly negative in
Germany (−0.7%) and Italy (−0.1%) and strongly negative in Japan (−1.5%).
 The social impact of STW is best measured in terms the cumulative jobs impact of
STW, that is, the sum of number of jobs saved in each quarter. We refer to this is that
gross impact. The gross impact is positive is substantial and positive in all countries,
except Japan. In Germany, the cumulative number of jobs saved each quarter
amounts to almost 1.2 million, while it amounts to 460.000 in Italy. Japan represents
an exception. The social impact was negative by about 15.000at the end of 2010.The analysis presented here assumes that the impact of STW is symmetric during
downturns and recoveries. There may be various reasons why this is not true in
practice. For example, Hijzen and Venn (2010) emphasize that the balance of costs of
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/5benefits is likely to vary over the cycle, turning more negative in recoveries. There may
also be composition effects that render the impact of STW asymmetric over the cycle.
For example, the use of STW may be relatively widespread in the context of an
economic downturn when many firms face financial difficulties, but is likely to be
limited to firms facing adverse business conditions in the recovery when most firms
are growing13. Additional analysis that allows for different effects of STW in recessions
and expansions does not suggest this is an important issue in practice. Hence, allowing
for asymmetries would not qualitatively change the results presented here.7. Simulation results
In order to more fully appreciate the implications of the results presented in Table 5, it is
useful to compare the evolution of employment, total hours and working time under differ-
ent assumptions about the persistence of the shock and the use of STW. Three different
scenarios are considered. Under the first scenario, the economy is hit by a 1% reduction in
GDP, but experiences an increase in GDP of 1% in the subsequent quarter. The take-up rate
of STW is assumed to remain constant at 1% during the downturn and the recovery. Under
the second scenario, the economy is also hit by a temporary decline in GDP of 1%, but in
this case the economy recovers only after four quarters. As before, the take-up rate is as-
sumed to remain constant during the downturn and the recovery. The third scenario is
similar to the second scenario in that it also relates to a more prolonged downturn, but dif-
fers in that it assumes no STW in the recovery. In order to get an idea of the effective-
ness of STW in these different scenarios, the cumulative difference in average
hours worked with and without STW during the downturn is interpreted as a
measure of the use of STW (up to t = 1 in the first scenario and t + 4 in the other
two scenarios). Comparing this with the cumulative difference in employment over
the first eight quarters provides an indication of the effectiveness of STW. To the
extent that the cumulative difference in employment falls short of the cumulative
difference in average hours worked, this may indicate that some jobs have been
supported that either did not need support or were not viable anyway. Figure 2
presents the evolution of employment, total hours and average hours of permanent
workers in the eight quarters that follow the initial decline in GDP.
 Under the first scenario in which the economy is hit by a short temporary reduction
in GDP, the employment impact associated with STW appears to be relatively small
compared with its impact on working time. While the difference in working time
associated with STW is 0.25% (up to t = 1), the cumulative difference in employment
is only 0.07% (up to t = 8). This suggests that the deadweight loss associated with
short-time work in the context of a very short downturn may be over 70% ((0.25-
0.07)/0.25). The relatively small impact of STW on employment reflects the fact that
employment tends to respond to output shocks with a time lag. As a result, a
relatively large fraction of jobs is supported that would be preserved anyway. The net
impact of STW on employment is zero after four quarters.
 In the context of a prolonged downturn as under the second scenario, the impact
of STW on employment is larger and STW tends to be more effective. Compared
with the first scenario, the cumulative impact of STW on employment increases
from 0.1% to 0.3% Moreover, STW tends to be somewhat more effective in
Table 6 Dynamic results of the impact of STW on unemployment rates


















−0.020 −0.028 −0.022 −0.009 −0.015 0.02
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Output 0.003 0.006 0.024 0.020 ** 0.023 *** 0.015
(0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Output growth t −0.066 *** −0.056 0.097 −0.130 *** −0.083 0.112
(0.023) (0.046) (0.152) (0.019) (0.054) (0.101)
t-1 −0.087 *** −0.112 ** −0.101 ** −0.136 *** −0.070 −0.026
(0.019) (0.049) (0.050) (0.021) (0.047) (0.074)
t-2 −0.041 * −0.025 0.020 −0.107 *** −0.086 * −0.017
(0.021) (0.042) (0.059) (0.023) (0.047) (0.062)
STW take-up rate t 0.001 0.000 −0.011 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
t-1 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
t-2 0.002 ** 0.001 * −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001




t −0.008 0.015 0.033* 0.026 0.032 0.028
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028)
t-1 −0.014 0.005 0.038 ** 0.056 *** 0.053 *** 0.080 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026)




















Table 6 Dynamic results of the impact of STW on unemployment rates (Continued)




t −0.001 0.012 0.003 0.011
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010)
t-1 −0.001 −0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
t-2 −0.003 0.000 −0.003 −0.005






t 0.025 −0.008 −0.034 −0.064
(0.024) (0.049) (0.028) (0.044)
t-1 0.031 0.042 0.000 −0.033
(0.028) (0.031) (0.027) (0.034)
t-2 0.017 −0.012 −0.026 −0.004




t 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
t-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000






t −0.002 ** −0.004 ** 0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
t-1 −0.002 * −0.003 *** −0.002 ** −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
t-2 −0.002 *** −0.002 *** 0.000 −0.001




















Table 6 Dynamic results of the impact of STW on unemployment rates (Continued)
Number of
countries
23 23 13 23 23 13
Number of
observations
372 367 210 592 576 383
R-squared 0.819 0.868 0.890 0.618 0.671 0.602
Robust standard errors in brackets. Regressions include country time quarter dummies and year dummies.
a) Output in logs.


















































































































































Figure 1 Impact of STW on permanent employment since the start of the crisis. Selected countries,
country-specific peak in GDP to 2010 Q4. a) Net impact refers to the difference in employment that can be
attributed to the use of STW since the start of the crisis. b) Gross impact refers to the cumulative impact
that can be attributed to the use of STW since the start of the crisis. Source: Authors’ estimates based on
Table 5, column 1.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/5prolonged recessions since this increases the likelihood that jobs are supported that
would have been suppressed otherwise. The cumulative impact of STW on
employment (0.3% up to t = 8) relative to that on average hours (0.9% up to t = 4)
suggests that deadweight costs may be two-thirds of the overall costs. The net
impact of STW on employment is zero after six quarters.
 In the context of a prolonged downturn where the take-up rate of STW is only
positive during the downturn, and is zero in the recovery, STW has a larger impact on
employment in gross terms, has a more persistent net impact on employment and
appears to be more effective. The cumulative impact of STW on employment is 0.4%
(up to t = 8). Given its impact on average hours (0.9% up to t = 4 since the use of STW
is assumed to be zero beyond), the deadweight losses associated with STW may be
about half of the overall cost. The net impact of STW on employment is still positive
after eight quarters as employment only converges slowly to its long-term trend. Thus,
the balance of STW is considerably more positive if its use is limited to economic
downturns. This is likely to be true in terms of its social, economic and fiscal costs.
Given the prolonged nature of the global crisis in most countries and the relatively
strong responsiveness of the intensity of STW to the improvement in economic
conditions in the recovery (see the beginning of this sub-section), the third scenario
may best describe the role of STW during the global financial crisis. This confirms
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/5the positive role that STW played in many OECD countries. However, it also
implies that the role of STW in future downturns may not necessarily be as positive
as was the case this time as it both depends on the nature of the crisis and the
responsiveness of STW to economic conditions. The institutional design of STW
programmes needs to take this into account14.8. Conclusions
There has been a strong interest in short-time work (STW) schemes during the global
financial crisis. Using data for 23 OECD countries, this paper analyses the quantitative
effects of STW programmes on labour market outcomes by exploiting the country and
time variation in STW take-up rates. The analysis takes account of differences in insti-
tutional settings across countries that might affect the relationship between labour mar-
ket outcomes and output and addresses the potential endogeneity of STW take-up with
respect to labour market conditions using the age of the programme as an instrument.
Moreover, special attention is given to model the dynamic aspects of the relationship
between output and labour market outcomes.
The results indicate the STW raises hours flexibility by increasing the contemporan-
eous output elasticity of working time and helps to preserve jobs in the context of a re-
cession by making employment and unemployment less elastic with respect to output.
A key finding is that the timing of STW is crucial. Short-time work schemes had a sig-
nificant impact on preserving jobs during the crisis. The largest impact is observed in
Germany, Italy and Japan where in the second half of 2009 employment is estimated to
have been, respectively, 580.000, 130.000 and 445.000 higher than what it would have
in the absence of STW. However, the same estimates also suggest that the continued
use of STW during the recovery exerted a negative influence over the job-content of
the recovery. As a result, the net effect on employment has fallen importantly in the re-
covery and in a few countries even has become negative.
Nevertheless, even in countries where the net impact has become negative, STW may
still have played a very important role in limiting the social costs of the crisis. Indeed, the
social impact of STW on employment, which is best measured in gross terms (the sum of
the number of jobs saved in each time period), was substantial and positive in almost all
countries. The impact of STW schemes is likely to be considerably more positive if their
use is limited to economic downturns. This is likely to be true in terms of its social,
economic and fiscal costs: it would have a larger positive impact on the number of jobs
saved in each period; it would help sustain the positive net effects of STW crisis for longer
during the recovery; and it would enhance the effectiveness of STW schemes.
In order to limit the use of STW to economic downturns, its use has to be very re-
sponsive to changes in economic conditions, both negative and positive. Factors that
may help to ensure that take-up does not persist for too long in a recovery are to re-
quire firms to participate in the cost of STW, to limit the maximum duration of STW
schemes and to require workers to search for a job whilst on STW.
Endnotes
1 Bargain et al. (2012) provide simulation evidence that suggests that adjustment on
the intensive margin (working time), tends to be associated with higher levels of welfare
than adjustment on the extensive margin (employment).
A. Short-term shock (one quarter) continued STW in recovery
Employment Total hours worked Average hours worked
B. One-year shock with continued STW in recovery
Employment Total hours worked Average hours worked
C. One-year shock with zero STW in recovery
Employment Total hours worked Average hours worked
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Figure 2 Simulated role of STW under three different scenarios. The average impact of an one percent
decline in GDP without STW or with a one percent take-up rate of STW on permanent workers. Source:
Authors’ estimates.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/52 The 2010 is the latest year for which comparable information on the use of STW
has been collected by the OECD on a systematic basis.
3 Calavrezo et al. (2009a and b) make use of French firm-level data from before the glo-
bal financial crisis to analyse the impact of the STW (chômage partiel) on layoffs and firm
survival. They find that chômage partiel tends to increase layoffs and reduce firm survival.
This may indicate that despite the use of sophisticated econometric methods, the problem
of selection bias has not been entirely removed. Berkeley Planning Associates &
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (1997) provide a comprehensive assessment of short-
time compensation programmes in the United States using a variety of methods and con-
clude that the available firm-level data do not allow one to reliably attribute differences in
outcomes between participating and control firms to short-time compensation.
4 See also Arpaia et al. (2010) for an early analysis of short-time work schemes.
5 Five of these countries are considered for the purposes of the analysis not to oper-
ate STW schemes. These are respectively Estonia, Greece, Sweden, the United King-
dom and the United States. Greece only has a programme that deals with shortfalls in
demand for seasonal or exceptional reasons and is therefore not considered as having a
STW scheme for the purposes of this paper. In the United States, STW schemes
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/5operated in seventeen states during the crisis, covering about half the labour force. As
the use of STW in those states was rather limited (Hijzen and Venn, 2010) and appro-
priate data to measure the use of take-up over time are not available, the United States
was considered not to have a scheme for the purposes of the analysis in this paper .
6 This may occur when firms have sufficiently strong incentives to retain redundant
workers during the period of reduced output demand or when private arrangements
between social partners are made to limit job losses (e.g. time-banking).
7 It is well know that least squares dummy variable models with a lagged dependent
variable yield inconsistent when N (the number of countries in this case) goes to infin-
ity and the number of time periods is help fixed (Nickell, 1981). However, Judson and
Owen (1999) show that such models yield reasonable estimates as long as the number
time periods is reasonably large (i.e. 20–30) as in the present case (the maximum num-
ber of periods per country is 28).
8 This excludes Korea, New Zealand, Slovenia, Turkey and the United States. The use
of short-time work was negligible in New Zealand and the United States, modest in
Korea and rather important in Slovenia and Turkey.
9 The differences between the coefficients on output changes in the total-hours equa-
tion and the sum of the corresponding coefficients in the employment and average-hours
equations largely reflect the fact that average hours are modelled somewhat differently.
10 Boeri and Brucker (2011) find stronger evidence of a direct negative effect on
employment.
11 This corresponds to an average hours reduction of about 25%. Comparing this with
direct figures on the average reduction in working time among STW participants
reported in Hijzen and Venn (2010) suggests this estimate is reasonable, although per-
haps somewhat on the low side.
12 The start of the crisis is defined by the country-specific peak of GDP.
13 A look at Additional file 1: Figure A1 explains why the negative net impact at 2010
Q4 is so negative. The rise of in take-up only really started once the economic started
to recover. This reflects a combination of various factors: the very sharp and sudden
decline in GDP; the relatively slow response in STW to the decline in output; and a fast
and steep initial recovery in GDP.
14 The measure of social impact is also useful when assessing the fiscal benefits in terms
of the reduction in unemployment-benefit payments. In order to get to the net fiscal im-
pact, these benefits need to be balanced against the STW subsidies paid to firms.
15 The present analysis effectively assumes that firms that make use of STW schemes
in the recovery face improving business conditions, even though this may not be the
case in practice. To the extent that firms with deteriorating business conditions are the
ones that continue to make use of STW schemes during the recovery, the current ana-
lysis over-emphasizes the potential negative effects of STW schemes in the recovery.
16 It is not straightforward to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of
short-time work schemes in individual countries. The labour market effects of STW
may differ importantly across countries, because of differences in the average reduc-
tion in working time per STW participants, because of differences in the institutional
features of short-time work schemes, differences in the institutional context in which
STW schemes operate and the sectoral composition of employment and output
changes.
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Additional file 1: Table A1. Sources and definitions of short-time work schemes data. Figure A1. Stock of
participants in STW schemes, 2007 Q1 to 2010 Q4.
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